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The Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry Merger: Three Into Two Won’t Go 
By 
Paul K. Gorecki 
Abstract 
The acquisition by Berendsen Ireland Limited of Kings Laundry Limited should have been prohibited by 
the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission, Ireland’s competition agency.  Instead the agency 
cleared the merger subject to the divestment of three of Berendsen’s healthcare contracts.  The 
Commission makes a compelling case for a finding that in the outsourced supply of flat linen rental and 
maintenance services to healthcare customers that the three to two merger would lead to a substantial 
lessening of competition.  The divestment of Kings Laundry healthcare operations, an appropriate remedy 
to restore competition, was not feasible.  The divestment of three healthcare contracts does not mitigate 
the anticompetitive effect of the merger: for customers that are the counterparties to the three contracts, 
the remedy will result in decline in the number of healthcare suppliers from three pre merger to two post 
merger.  Neither of these two providers is likely to be an especially vigorous competitor.  For all other 
healthcare customers, although the number of healthcare suppliers remains unchanged at three - pre and 
post merger, the evidence suggests that the purchaser of the three contracts is unlikely to replicate Kings 
Laundry as a significant competitive force in healthcare.  The failure to implement the remedy within the 
nine month window deemed appropriate by the European Commission in its Remedies Notice raises 
concerns that Kings Laundry as a competitive force will become, in European Commission parlance, 
“degraded.” 
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I. Introduction 
On 8 July 2019 the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC), Ireland’s competition 
agency,1 cleared the acquisition by Berendsen Ireland Limited (Berendsen), ultimately controlled by Elis 
S. A. (Elis), of Kings Laundry Limited (Kings Laundry), subject to a divestment remedy.2  It was determined 
that, given this remedy, the merger would not lead to a substantial lessening of competition (SLC), the 
competition test used by the CCPC.  The transaction was notified to the CCPC on 7 August 2018, Phase II 
initiated on 9 January 2019.  There was no appeal on the CCPC’s decision.3 
The CCPC’s Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry merger determination is a thorough, in-depth merger 
investigation.  The determination itself contains 174 pages, while the CCPC also published, separately, a 
69 page survey that it commissioned of linen laundry customers in healthcare and hospitality.4 Economic 
expert reports were also commissioned by the CCPC on: (i) aspects of market definition and the impact of 
the proposed transaction; and, (ii) on issues raised by the parties concerning bidding markets.5 
In contrast to recent CCPC merger investigations, an Assessment (or a Statement of Objections in 
European Commission parlance) was issued in Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry by the CCPC on 28 March 
2019.6  The last time that the CCPC issued an Assessment was on 25 July 2008,  almost eleven years 
previously, in the Kerry/Breeo merger investigation.7   However, the CCPC prohibited the latter merger, a 
decision subsequently overturned by the High Court.8  In contrast, in Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry the 
merger was cleared by the CCPC subject to the divestment by Berendsen of three of its contracts with 
healthcare providers.   
This paper explores whether the divestment remedy was sufficient to alleviate the CCPC’s competition 
concerns.  In other words, should the merger have been prohibited? This involves not only an assessment 
of the CCPC’s compelling finding that, but for any acceptable proposals from the parties, that the 
Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry would have resulted in an SLC, but also an examination of the efficacy of 
the merger remedy proposed by the parties and accepted by the CCPC, thus becoming a binding 
commitment.  Since the finding of SLC and associated divestment was confined to the healthcare market, 
that is the focus of the paper. 
 
1 The CCPC was formed in October 2014 by the combination of the Competition Authority, Ireland’s competition 
agency at the time, and the National Consumer Agency. Unless otherwise specified CCPC will refer to both the CCPC 
and Competition Authority.  
2 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry.  All CCPC merger determinations may be found on its website: 
www.ccpc.ie.  
3 Only the parties to the merger can appeal under the Competition Act 2002, as amended.  Merger control was 
assumed by the Competition Authority on 1 January 2003. Prior to that date merger control was the responsibility 
of the relevant Minister using a public interest test.  For a discussion of the merger provisions of the 2002 Act see 
Andrews, Gorecki & McFadden (2015, pp. 247-378). 
4 Amarach Research (2019). 
5 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 1.44-1.45.  The economic expert reports were prepared by 
PMCA Economic Consulting and DotEcon Ltd, respectively.  
6 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 1.23. 
7 M/08/009 – Kerry/Breeo, paragraph 1.41. 
8 For a discussion of the High Court judgment and surrounding issues see Andrews, Gorecki & McFadden (2015, pp. 
299-302); and, Gorecki (2009). 
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The paper is divided into seven sections.  Details of the parties are set out in Section II, while Section III 
presents the main points of the CCPC’s extensive reasoned analysis of whether not the transaction would 
result in an SLC in one or more relevant markets, together with an overview of the divestment remedy.  
Attention then turns to a commentary of the CCPC’s reasoned  merger determination: whether the 
redactions in the published determination are merited (Section IV); the strength and quality of the 
competitive assessment (Section V); and, the appropriateness of the divestment remedy (Section VI). 
Section VII concludes by addressing three issues/questions: does the divestment remedy resolve the 
competitive harm identified by the CCPC’s analysis; would the prohibition of the merger have been 
disproportionate; and, are there important differences with the CCPC’s Kerry/Breeo experience.  
II. Background: the Parties9 
Berendsen’s activities in the State consist of the rental and maintenance of workwear to customers in 
various sectors; flat linen to customers in the healthcare (e.g. bed blankets)  and hospitality (e.g. double 
and king-sized bed linen items) sectors; mats; mops; and, cleanroom garments to organisations operating 
cleanrooms such as pharmaceutical and high-tech industries. Berendsen is also involved in the provision 
of washroom services. Berendsen operates eight facilities in the State. In 2017 it had a turnover of €33 
million and employed 550 persons.10 
Berendsen was included in the September 2017 purchase for £2.2 billion of Berendsen plc, “a focused 
European textile, hygiene and safety solution company.”11 Berendsen plc’s acquisition was part of Elis’s 
wider strategy to “become a pan-European leader in the provision of textile, hygiene and facility 
solutions.”12 In February 2020, for example, Elis acquired Textil Washing Co. in the Czech Republic.13  
Kings Laundry  provides rental and maintenance of flat linen to customers in the healthcare and hospitality 
sectors. It has two facilities – Dublin and Cork - in the State supplying these services.  The firm was 
established in 2000, with the Cork facility opening in May 2016.14 In 2017 Kings Laundry had a turnover of 
€30 million and employed approximately 500 persons.15 It is reported  that Elis paid between €22 million 
and €30 million for Kings Laundry.16 
Berendsen and Kings Laundry overlap in the rental and maintenance of flat linen to customers in the 
healthcare and hospitality sectors.  Maintenance is defined as “the collection and processing (i.e., sorting, 
washing, drying, ironing, folding and packing) of used and soiled items and the delivery of clean items. 
 
9 Unless otherwise indicated this section is based on M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 1.3-1.9 
and paragraph 3.33. 
10 Employment and turnover were sourced from: http://www.top1000.ie/berendsen-ireland.  
11 https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2017/09/12/1117793/0/en/Elis-Completion-of-acquisition-of-
Berendsen.html.  The £2.2 billion estimate is sourced from: https://www.ft.com/content/5a9b278c-4ba9-11e7-
919a-1e14ce4af89b.  This merger was not notified in the State. 
12 https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2017/09/12/1117793/0/en/Elis-Completion-of-acquisition-of-
Berendsen.html.  
13 https://uk.advfn.com/stock-market/EURONEXT/ELIS/share-news/Elis-announces-the-acquisition-of-Textil-
Washing-C/81649822.  
14 https://www.kingslaundry.com/why-choose-kings-laundry/.  
15 https://www.irishtimes.com/business/retail-and-services/irish-firm-kings-laundry-acquired-by-french-giant-
1.3577371.  The source states that the firm employed between 450 and 550 depending on the season; 500 is the 
midpoint. 
16 https://bizplus.ie/kings-laundry-takeover-cleared/.  
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Items may also be repaired as part of maintenance.”17 Flat linen is defined as “linen products including 
flat-ironed bed sheets, pillowcases and tablecloths.”18 
III. Merger Analysis & Proposed Remedy 
Market Definition19 
The CCPC defined two product markets: “for the outsourced supply of flat linen rental and maintenance 
services to healthcare customers … ;” and,  “for the outsourced supply of flat linen to hospitality customers 
… .”20  For both the healthcare and hospitality product markets the CCPC considered that the relevant 
geographic market was the State. 
There was general agreement between the parties, customers, competitors and the CCPC that the 
healthcare and hospitality sectors constituted separate product markets.  There are demand side 
differences between the customers in the two markets in terms of the type of linen items and hygiene 
standard specification.  For example, on the latter, one respondent to a CCPC questionnaire stated: 
“Hospitality customers have no hygiene requirements. Some private healthcare customers 
require a hygiene certification such as BS EN 14065, some have no hygiene certification 
requirements. Large public healthcare customers require hygiene certification such as BS EN 
14065.”21 
This was confirmed by responses to the CCPC’s survey of customers.22 
There was, however, a difference of view between the parties and the CCPC about whether or not the 
self-supply of flat linen and its maintenance by healthcare and/or hospitality customers should be 
included as part of the product definition. Self-supply is referred to as on-premises laundry or OPL.  The 
parties argued for OPL’s inclusion in the product market on the grounds, inter alia, that some hospitals 
and hotels operate their own OPLs, that there is a ready market in the supply of laundry equipment, and 
that the costs of setting up an on-premise laundry are relatively low.23 The CCPC rejected these arguments.  
The CCPC, for example, cited the fact that larger customers “unanimously considered that setting up OPLs 
would not be a viable option in response to a 5% to 10% price increase.”24 
There was general agreement that the relevant geographic market was the State, although the parties 
qualified this by stating that the geographic market was at least State-wide.25 The CCPC considered 
whether or not Northern Ireland should be included in the geographic market definition, concluding that 
 
17 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, footnote 4. 
18 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, footnote 5. 
19 Unless otherwise indicated this section is based on M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 3.1-
3.112. 
20 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 3.112.  Healthcare customers include hospitals and nursing 
homes; hospitality, hotels, bed & breakfasts.  
21 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 3.13. 
22 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 3.15. 
23 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 3.5. 
24 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 3.17.  This result is cited in paragraphs 3.61 and 3.74. 
Customers are defined in paragraph 10.2. 
25 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 3.9. 
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it “did not observe any significant evidence that would merit the inclusion of Northern Ireland.”26  
Nonetheless in the CCPC’s competitive assessment of the merger, attention was paid to suppliers in 
Northern Ireland acting as a competitive constraint on the merged entity’s ability to raise price post 
merger. 
Market Structure27 
The CCPC estimated, based on information supplied by both the parties and competitors, the market 
shares for participants in the healthcare and hospitality markets, annually, for 2014 to 2018, together with 
the Herfindahl-Hirshman (HHI) summary measure of concentration.  The results for the healthcare market 
are presented in Table 1.28 
Table 1 
Outsourced Supply of Flat Linen Rental & Maintenance Services to Healthcare Customers, Market 
Share, Ireland, 2014-2018. 
Undertaking 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018a 
 Market Share (%)b 
Berendsen [40-50] [40-50] [40-50]  [50-60] [50-60] 
Kings Laundry [0-10] [0-10] [0-10] [10-20] [10-20] 
Combined [50-60] [50-60] [50-60] [60-70] [60-70] 
Increment [0-10] [0-10] [0-10] [10-20] [10-20] 
Celtic Linen [30-40] [30-40] [40-50] [30-40] [30-40] 
Others [10-20] [0-10] [0-10] [0-10] [0-10] 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) 
Pre-merger n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4249 
Post-merger n.a n.a. n.a. n.a. 5348 
Delta n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1249 
a. January-June 2018. 
b. Market share measured in terms of sales. 
n.a. = not available. 
Source: M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, Table 12, p. 96; Table 13, p. 98. 
 
The CCPC stated that “the merged entity will enjoy a very strong position in the healthcare market with a 
market share of over [60-70]% and a market share increment of approximately [10-20]% as a result of the 
Proposed Transaction.”29 There were only three significant healthcare suppliers pre-merger; two post-
merger. It is thus a three to two merger in the healthcare market. 
 
26 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 3.104. 
27 Unless otherwise indicated this section is based on M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 4.56-
4.77 (hospitality), and 4.210-4.225 (healthcare). 
28 The corresponding information for the hospitality market can be found in M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings 
Laundry, Tables 3, p. 58 & 5, pp. 61-62.  The combined market share of the parties in the hospitality market is lower 
than in the healthcare market ([40-50] per cent compared to [60-70] per cent), while there are several credible 
competitors beside Celtic Linen.  The post merger HHI (3283) and delta (609) are also lower in the hospitality market.  
29 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.222. 
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Berendsen and Kings Laundry both gradually increased their market share over the period 2014-2018.  
The market share expansion of the parties was at the expense of Others and, after 2016, of Celtic Linen.   
The HHI is a summary measure of concentration and is used as a screen by competition authorities 
worldwide.  The CCPC is no exception.30  The HHI in healthcare meets the CCPC’s threshold for being 
considered “highly concentrated,” greater than 2000, both pre and post merger. Furthermore, the delta 
– the change in the value of the HHI between pre and post merger – at 1249 substantially exceeds the 
CCPC threshold of 150 below which is “unlikely to cause concern.”31 
The Counterfactual32 
Typically, in merger assessments the pre merger situation is the counterfactual.  In other words, it is 
assumed that absent the merger the parties to the merger would have continued to operate in 
competition with one another.33  However, this is not always the ideal counterfactual.  An obvious 
exception is the failing firm, where absent the merger one of the parties would have exited the market.34 
In  the CCPC’s assessment of Berendsen’s acquisition of Kings Laundry the pre merger situation is also the 
counterfactual.  The CCPC considers that absent the merger that Kings Laundry “will continue to expand 
in both the hospitality and healthcare markets.”35  The CCPC view is based on pre merger internal 
documents, statements and behaviour of both Berendsen and Kings Laundry. In contrast the parties 
argued that these pre merger internal documents, statements and behaviour should be discounted by the 
CCPC in view of the post merger notification claims by Kings Laundry that “it does not intend to expand in 
healthcare … .”36  The CCPC, however, attached more weight to the pre (as opposed to post) 
announcement of merger internal documents, statements and behaviour consistent with its own Merger 
Guidelines37 and the position of the International Competition Network.38  
The parties also claimed that the CCPC had not adequately addressed how Kings Laundry would overcome 
barriers to expansion in the healthcare market.  In response to these claims the CCPC, for example, 
assessed, in some detail, whether Kings Laundry can upgrade its Cork facility for private healthcare 
customers.  The CCPC concluded that this “ability to upgrade within this timeframe, and with this level of 
investment would be considered as an ability to expand in a timely and sufficient manner.”39  
In sum the CCPC concluded that  
“… the most plausible and relevant counterfactual is that, absent the merger, Berendsen and 
Kings Laundry will continue to compete for the supply of flat linen rental and maintenance 
 
30 For details see: CCPC (2014, paragraphs 3.9-3.13). 
31 For details see: CCPC (2014, paragraph 3.11). 
32 Unless otherwise stated this section is based on M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 4.1-4.26. 
33 CCPC (2014, paragraph 1.14). 
34 The failing firm defence for a merger is set out in CCPC (2014, paragraphs 9.1-9.12).  One of the few instances 
where the failing firm was considered the appropriate counterfactual by the CCPC is M/15/026 – Baxter 
Healthcare/Fannin Compounding. 
35 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.3. 
36 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.11. 
37 CCPC (2014, paragraphs 1.15 & 7.11). 
38 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.10. 
39 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.16.  The timeframe was redacted.  
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services to customers in both the hospitality and healthcare markets, and that Kings Laundry 
is likely to expand its activities in the healthcare market.”40  
Competitive Assessment: Unilateral Effects Theory of Harm 
Introduction 
The CCPC approach to assessing the competitive effects of the merger was structured as follows: pre-
competitive pressure exerted by Kings Laundry; closeness of competition between the two parties; 
competitor constraints; the impact of the merger on prices and/or quality; entry and/or expansion; and, 
countervailing buyer power (CBP).  The CCPC uses the same approach for its competitive assessment for 
both the hospitality and healthcare markets. 
The CCPC concluded that the merger: “was not expected to result in significant unilateral effects in relation 
to the hospitality market;”41 but that “the merged entity will have an ability and incentive to increase 
prices/reduce service quality in the healthcare market, which will ultimately result in consumer harm.”42 
Attention is confined here to the healthcare market. 
It should be noted that the CCPC considered, briefly, the likelihood of coordinated effects for both the 
hospitality and healthcare markets.  In both cases the CCPC found no evidence of such effects.43 
Nature of Competition44 
Prior to commencing its competitive assessment, the CCPC considers the nature of competition.  The 
healthcare (and hospitality) markets were characterised as  bidding markets45 as opposed to customers 
selecting providers on the basis of posted prices. Under certain restrictive assumptions Bertrand 
competition in a bidding market with only two participants leads to a perfectly competitive outcome. 
However, the CCPC finds these assumptions such as homogeneous product, price transparency and no 
capacity constraints  are not satisfied. The CCPC states at the conclusion of its analysis of the evidence on 
the nature of competition in the healthcare market that it “is not consistent with the parties’ view of 
bidding markets, where competition concerns around a 3-to2 merger can be suspended in a belief that 
even two competitors will provide a good competitive outcome.”46  
The Competitive Pressure from Kings Laundry47 
The CCPC takes the view that Kings Laundry “is an important and effective competitor in the healthcare 
market.”48  As can be seen from Table 1, Kings Laundry increased its market share of the healthcare market 
over the period 2014 to 2018 from [0-10] per cent to [10-20] per cent. Kings Laundry differentiated itself 
 
40 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.26. 
41 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.209. 
42 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.378. 
43 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.380-4.386. 
44 Unless otherwise stated this section is based on M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 4.27-4.52. 
45 I.e., “competition … takes place for contracts (which may be formally tendered or informally negotiated on the 
basis of requests for proposals).” M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.29. 
46 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.52. 
47 Unless otherwise stated this section is based on M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 4.265-
4.274. 
48 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.265. 
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by “providing high service quality via a dedicated linen system …,” while customers “perceive Kings 
Laundry as innovative and as providing high quality service.”49  Finally, Kings Laundry has demonstrated a 
willingness to invest in new equipment to achieve greater efficiencies.  
Closeness of Competition50 
As the CCPC notes the degree to which the merging parties are close competitors with each other is 
important to establish.  When merging parties are close competitors, then a merger by “removing a strong 
competitive constraint  … [will] be more likely to raise competition concerns than a merger between distant 
competitors.”51 The CCPC uses several sources of evidence to establish the degree to which Berendsen 
and Kings Laundry are close competitors: the views of the parties, competitors and customers; internal 
documents; analysis of tendering data and the parties customer loss data; and the Amarach survey ( 
Research, 2019). The tendering data, for example, referred to the period 2014-2018 including for Kings 
Laundry (and Berendsen) the frequency with which they experienced rival bids from other healthcare 
providers.   
Based on the analysis of these sources of evidence the CCPC concludes: 
4.302 The evidence presented … above suggests that the pre-merger healthcare market is a 
market with 3 significant players. Celtic Linen is the main competitive constraint on 
Berendsen’s probability of winning a tender, and Kings Laundry is a constraint on 
Berendsen’s probability of winning a tender in tenders where both Berendsen and Kings 
Laundry participated. Thus, the Proposed Transaction will result in the removal of an 
important and significant competitor to both Berendsen and Celtic Linen and reduce the 
number of important and significant competitors in the healthcare market from 3 to 2.    
Competitive Constraints on the Merged Entity: Competitors52 
Not surprisingly, based on Table 1, Celtic Linen is the only significant competitor to the parties.  Celtic 
Linen had a market share of the healthcare market in 2018 of [30-40] per cent unchanged from 2014, 
despite a brief increase to [40-50] per cent in 2016.  While the CCPC considers that Celtic Linen, which 
recently emerged from examinership, will continue as a competitor in the healthcare market it “will not 
replace the loss of competitive pressure exerted by Kings Laundry pre-merger.”53   Indeed, the CCPC is 
concerned that Celtic Linen will have the ability and incentive to raise prices in response to a post merger 
price increase by the merged entity (i.e. price accommodation).54  No other healthcare suppliers appear 
to be able to act as a competitive constraint on the merged entity apart from Celtic Linen.  This is 
consistent with the CCPC’s observation that “no linen laundry other than Berendsen, Kings Laundry and 
Celtic Linen have tendered for any of the hospital contracts which have been issued in the last 5 years.”55 
 
49 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 4.266, 4.268, respectively. 
50 Unless otherwise stated this section is based on M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 4.275-
4.304. 
51 CCPC (2014, paragraph 4.19). 
52 Unless otherwise stated this section is based on M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 4.305-
4.313. 
53 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.308. 
54 CCPC (2014, paragraph 4.11).  
55 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.310. 
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Competitive Constraints on the Merged Entity: Entry/Expansion56 
According to the CCPC’s Merger Guidelines, for entry/expansion to be a credible constraint on the merged 
entity, it must be timely, likely and sufficient.57  These three conditions are cumulative.   
The CCPC identified a number of barriers to entry/expansion which are likely to reduce the importance of 
the threat of entry/expansion: substantial financial investment; adherence to certain hygiene quality 
standards evidenced through accreditation; demonstration of previous experience delivering healthcare 
contracts, which “96% of healthcare customers said … was either essential or very important;”58 and, 
contingency plans in place to ensure continuity of supply. The CCPC also examined the record of 
entry/expansion and the plans of various market participants as well as Berendsen’s internal documents.  
The CCPC concluded its discussion on entry/expansion as follows,  
“4.352 The evidence provided to the Commission did not enable the Commission to conclude 
with sufficient confidence that any supplier will enter/expand to provide flat linen rental and 
maintenance services to healthcare customers in a timely, likely and sufficient manner to 
mitigate or prevent the identified SLC or prevent the loss of competitive pressure exerted by 
Kings Laundry pre-transaction. … The Commission’s view is that the barriers to 
entry/expansion are of sufficient magnitude to prevent timely market entry, and would not 
prevent the merged entity from increasing prices/reducing service quality following the 
implementation of the Proposed Transaction.” 
Competitive Constraints on the Merged Entity: Countervailing Buyer Power (CBP)59 
CBP can potentially offset and act as a competitive constraint on the merged entity.  In examining CBP the 
CCPC’s extensive assessment of the evidence refers to: customer switching from the merged entity; 
number, nature and viability of alternative options; size and significance of individual customers; and, the 
extent to which the CBP of some customers will benefit other customers.  The CCPC concludes that the 
merger will remove a “key supplier and reduce healthcare customers’ CBP… . The Commission’s conclusion 
is therefore that customers do not have sufficient buyer power to prevent an SLC.”60   
Assessment: Merger’s Price &/or Quality Effects61 
The CCPC examined the likely effects of the merger on price and/or quality.  In doing so it notes that Celtic 
Linen will continue as a competitor to the merged entity and “the remaining [healthcare suppliers] … are 
unlikely to offset the loss of Kings Laundry’s competitive constraint, because their activity is extremely 
limited.”62  Six of the eight customers identified by the parties as being most significant to their business 
 
56 Unless otherwise stated this section is based on M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 4.332-
4.352. 
57 CCPC (2014, paragraph 6.1-6.22). 
58 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.339, based on the Amarach Research (2019). 
59 Unless otherwise stated this section is based on M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 4.353-
4.377. 
60 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.377. 
61 Unless otherwise stated this section is based on M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 4.314-
4.331. 
62 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.317. 
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“expressed a significant level of concern.”63 Celtic Linen is, according to the CCPC, likely to accommodate 
any price rise by the merged entity, in part because of its “recent exit from examinership and the fact that 
it made a post-tax loss of approximately €1.6 million in 2017.”64 Although the CCPC did not estimate the 
price impact of the merger, it refer to estimates of the price effects of a three to two merger that 
suggested substantial loss of consumer surplus and price increases.65 As a result, the CCPC concluded that 
the merger “is likely to enable the merged entity to profitably raise price or reduce service quality.”66  
Remedies67 
Introduction 
Under the Competition Act 2002, the CCPC has three options at the conclusion of its Phase II investigation: 
clear the merger unconditionally; prohibit the merger; or clear the merger subject to conditions.  Since 
the CCPC’s competition assessment led it to the conclusion that the merger will result in an SLC in the 
healthcare market unconditional clearance was not an option. In considering the choice between the two 
remaining options, the CCPC took the view that since Kings Laundry’s sales are skewed towards the 
hospitality sector68 if “the SLC concerns in the healthcare market are capable of being addressed either 
through proposals or specified conditions, it may not be proportionate to require that the merger  may not 
be put into effect.”   
The Proposals  
The first set of proposals put forward by Berendsen were rejected by the CCPC on the grounds that they 
were “inappropriate and insufficient.”69 As a result, these proposals were not market tested.  No 
information is provided in the CCPC’s merger determination concerning the content and nature of these 
proposals. 
The second set of proposals, which consisted of the merged entity disposing of a package of healthcare 
contracts, were considered acceptable to the CCPC apart from some unspecified implementations risks. 
The CCPC market tested, through phone interviews, the second set of proposals with five competitors and 
five customers.70 
All of the customers expressed concerns about the “reduction in the number of significant suppliers in the 
healthcare market from 3 to 2” and “expressed  a preference for having more than 2 potential bidders in 
 
63 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.318. 
64 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.320. 
65 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.329.  Although not referred to by the CCPC, an ex post 
analysis of four firm to three firm mergers in the mobile phone market in Austria, Ireland and Germany found that 
there were merged induced price increases.  For details see: BEREC (2018).   
66 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.331. 
67 Unless otherwise stated this section is based on M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 1.30-1.38 
& 5.1-5.20; Section 9, “Berendsen’s Proposals,” pp. 146-155. 
68 This is the author’s inference from M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 5.2.  All the relevant 
data are completely redacted. 
69 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 5.5.   
70 Given that the only other significant competitor to the merging parties was Celtic Linen this raises the question of 
the identity of the other four competitors.  On this the CCPC states: “For the purposes of the market testing, 
competitors included laundries not currently active in the healthcare market, but with some potential to enter.” 
(M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, footnote 636, p. 140). 
11 | P a g e  
 
the market.”71  Two customers thought that the package was insufficient for the establishment of a new 
competitor; two that the package was sufficient. All customers listed the key criteria that a new supplier 
would be expected to meet including: “(i) adherence to infection control/prevention guidelines; (ii) service 
reliability; (iii) customer service; (iv) experience of providing flat linen rental and  maintenance services to 
healthcare customers of a similar size; and (v) demonstrable ability to plan for contingencies and 
emergencies.”72  
In terms of competitors, “Four of the five … thought that the divestment of contracts could be an effective 
remedy, but this was subject to the scope and nature of the divested contracts (e.g., size and location of 
customers).” Three of the five competitors “expressed interest in principle in purchasing healthcare 
contracts.  All of these [competitors] noted that more information about nature of the contracts to be 
divested … would be required before they could fully confirm interest.”73 
 The third set of proposals were deemed acceptable to the CCPC. These were summarised by the CCPC as 
follows: 
• “Divest three […] healthcare contracts, […] to a [single]  third party purchaser approved 
by the Commission;  
• Divest such additional healthcare contracts of an aggregate value (by reference to 
2018 revenue figures), which, when aggregated with the value of the […] healthcare 
contracts referred to above, have a total value of […]; and  
• Divest the rights and title in ancillary items such as linen stock (but excluding, for the 
avoidance of doubt, any facilities or fixed assets (e.g., washers, dryers, or trucks)) as 
required by a Third Party Purchaser and to otherwise assist the Third Party Purchaser 
to enable it to provide the services in respect of the relevant Healthcare Contracts. 
or  
• If it became apparent to Berendsen that it was unable to divest the three […] healthcare 
contracts in the manner described above, it would enter into discussions with the 
Commission to identify an alternative package of healthcare contracts that could be 
divested to an approved third party purchaser(s) and that would address the 
Commission’s competition concerns.”74 
Reference to the three contract divestment package refers to the first three bullet points, while the fourth 
bullet point is referred to as the alternative package.75  
The transaction cannot be implemented “unless and until”76 the CCPC confirmed that the proposals had 
been complied with (i.e. Kings Laundry continues to operate under its pre merger ownership and 
management until the CCPC’s confirmation).   The necessity of an upfront buyer appears to have satisfied 
 
71 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 5.9.   
72 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 5.11. 
73 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 5.13.  This wording, as well as that in paragraph 5.10, 
suggests that the precise nature of the three contracts to be divested was not specified in (e.g., length, nature of 
customer, active vs passive sales etc) which limits the value of the market testing. 
74 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 5.17. 
75 In M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, they are referred to as Package A and package B, respectively. 
76 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 5.18. 
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the CCPC’s concerns over implementation risks.  If the commitments are not complied with by Berendsen, 
then Berendsen “will terminate the Share Purchase Agreement.”77 
In Section 9 of the CCPC’s merger determination, “Berendsen’s Proposals,” the commitments are outlined 
in some detail including the administrative mechanisms to oversee the implementation of the divestment 
package.  Suffice to say that a Monitoring Trustee provides monthly reports to the CCPC on the 
implementation of the proposals outlined above.  Berendsen agreed to the appointment of the Berendsen 
Manager with responsibility for operating the three contracts that are to be divested “with a view to 
ensuring their continued economic viability, marketability, and competitiveness.”78   
IV.      Commentary: Redactions - Too Much Pruning? 
It is important for reasons of accountability and transparency that the published Berendsen (Elis)/Kings 
Laundry merger determination provide enough information such that the reader can assess the basis on 
which the CCPC made its decision, including proposals/commitments. Competition legislation provides 
some constraints, however, on the discretion of the CCPC in this regard.  Under s 22(4) of the Competition 
Act 2002, the CCPC “shall reduce the determination to writing … and … publish the determination with due 
regard for commercial confidentiality … .”  In practice this means that the CCPC sends the unredacted 
merger determination to the parties for their suggested redactions and then, depending on the nature 
and extent, either accepting the proposed changes or arguing for fewer, less extensive redactions.79     
The CCPC’s Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry merger determination market share figures within 10 
percentage point ranges and the actual estimate HHI index for suppliers in the healthcare and hospitality 
markets are published.80  In contrast, the data on tender participation,  frequency of tender success and 
diversion ratios, presented in six tables for healthcare, are completely redacted.81 It could be argued that 
this is consistent with earlier CCPC practice in M/06/027 – Tetra Laval/Carlisle,82 but that in that merger 
this analysis was far less extensive. On the other hand, a more appropriate and timely comparison might 
be with the comprehensive analysis of bidding in Annex I of the European Commission’s 2015 M.7278 – 
General Electric/Alstom (Thermal-Renewable Power Grid Business) where, although a certain amount of 
bidding data was redacted, nevertheless tender participation rates and win rates were published albeit 
within 10 percentage point ranges, consistent with the publication of market share data by both the CCPC 
and the European Commission. 
A vitally important aspect of the CCPC’s merger determination is the remedy.  In this regard, however, 
there is at least one vitally important piece of information that is completed redacted.  As shown in Table 
1 above, Kings Laundry’s healthcare market share was [10-20] per cent.  The three contracts that are to 
be divested by Berendsen are designed to replicate the competitive presence of Kings Laundry. Since Kings 
 
77 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, Section 9, Clause 16. 
78 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, Section 9, Clause 27. 
79 This approach is consistent with: CCPC, “Merger and Acquisitions Procedures,” 31 October 2014, paragraph 4.3; 
and the author’s experience as a Member of the Competition Authority responsible for merger control. Businesses 
varied considerable in what they regarded as commercially confidential.  While often there are concerns over market 
share data being published, this was not always the case. In M/08/011 – Heineken/Scottish & Newcastle, Section 5, 
for example, individual brand market shares are published to one decimal place. 
80 See Table 1 above for details with respect to the healthcare market. 
81 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, Tables 14-19, pp. 111-116. 
82 M/06/027 – Tetra Laval/Carlisle, Tables 3 & 4, pp. 19-20. 
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Laundry, in the CCPC’s counterfactual analysis, is expected to grow market share absent the merger, then 
this suggests that the three divested contracts should be in the upper part of the [10-20] per cent range 
if not in the low 20s. However, without information on the market share of the three contracts, even in 
the form of a percentage range, there is no way of judging – in terms of market share – the adequacy of 
the three divested contracts.83 
In sum, it appears that even within the legislative constraints to which the CCPC is subject, more 
information for healthcare on tendering and on the market share of the three Berendsen contracts to be 
divested could have been published.  
V. Commentary: Merger Analysis - Is the Finding of SLC Justified? 
The CCPC’s merger analysis is impressive.  The CCPC’s Merger Guidelines are carefully followed.   The 
examination of tendering and diversion ratios is probably more thorough and extensive than in any other 
previous CCPC merger determination.  The issues raised by the parties in response to the CCPC’s 
Assessment are stated and addressed.  The CCPC’s finding of SLC in the healthcare market is persuasive, 
even if the remedy – discussed below – is not.  Nevertheless, there is one albeit minor issue that is perhaps 
worth raising. 
In considering the impact of the merger the market shares of the parties are added together to derive the 
merged entity’s market share.  In the healthcare market it is a three to two merger. Customers, it is argued 
by the CCPC, like to have two sources of supply.84  Hence if pre merger a customer achieved this by 
sourcing from Berendsen and Kings Laundry, post merger it might achieve this by dual sourcing from the 
merged entity and Celtic Laundry.  In other words, the merged entity might experience some loss of 
market share as some customers switched to ensure two sources of supply. However, to the extent that 
dual sourcing reflects  the “importance of reliability and continuity of supply”85 then the merged entity 
with multiple facilities in the same geographic area, might be able to provide the assurance of reliability 
and continuity of supply by supplying the customer from both facilities.    
 
VI. Commentary: Remedy - Does it Cure the Competitive Harm?  
Introduction  
In considering the adequacy of the remedy in the Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry merger the European 
Commission’s Remedies Notice standard is followed:86 
9. … The commitments have to eliminate the competition concerns entirely and have to be 
comprehensive and effective from all points of view. Furthermore, commitments must be 
capable of being implemented effectively within a short period of time as the conditions of 
 
83 The Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry merger determination redacts virtually all quantitative information on the 
importance of customers in accounting for the business of the merged entity or the healthcare market more widely.  
(See, for example,  M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.367). If the CCPC can publish the market 
shares of the leading suppliers in the healthcare market it is not clear why similar information cannot also be 
published with respect to healthcare customers.   
84 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 4.312, 4.369 & 4.376. 
85 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.312. 
86 EC (2008). 
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competition on the market will not be maintained until the commitments have been 
fulfilled.” 
The European Commission’s guidance is used in the absence of CCPC remedy guidance.  The CCPC cites 
European Commission cases and guidance, including on remedies, in its merger determinations.87 
Drawing on the European Commission’s Remedies Notice three cumulative criteria need to be satisfied in 
order for a remedy to be considered successful: a viable/competitive divestment package; a suitable 
purchaser; and, little or no implementation risk.  These three criteria are, of course, interrelated.  If the 
divested business is viable and competitive and there are several suitable purchasers, then it is likely that 
there will be few, if any, implementation risks.  Each criterion is considered in turn. 
The Divestment Package 
The European Commission considers that “Divestment commitments are the best way to eliminate 
competition problems resulting from horizontal overlaps … ,”88 a position also held by the CCPC.89  By 
divestment the European Commission (and the CCPC) mean a viable and competitive business that can 
compete with the merged entity.  In some instances, the divested business may be confined to the 
horizontal overlap where the competitive concerns arise,90 in others, for various reasons such as 
establishing a viable business, the divestment package might extend beyond the horizontal overlap to 
include activities where competition concerns were not identified.91  
The European Commission also considers that the merged entity should not be able to reacquire the 
divested business.  The reasoning of the European Commission is: 
“43. In order to maintain the structural effect of a remedy, the commitments have to 
foresee that the merged entity cannot subsequently acquire influence over the whole or 
parts of the divested business. The commitments will normally have to foresee that no 
reacquisition of material influence is possible for a significant period, generally of 10 
years. However, the commitments can also provide for a waiver allowing the Commission 
to relieve the parties from this obligation if it subsequently finds that the structure of the 
market has changed to such an extent that the absence of influence over the divested 
business is no longer necessary to render the concentration compatible with the common 
market. Even in the absence of an explicit clause, a reacquisition of the business would 
violate an implicit obligation on the parties under the commitments as this would affect 
the effectiveness of the remedies.”   
In the Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry merger a divestment remedy confined to the area of overlap where 
SLC was identified would have been restricted to the healthcare market.  If this option was selected then 
the merged entity would have had to divest itself of a healthcare business capable of replicating Kings 
 
87 See, for example: M/07/040 – Communicorp/SRH, paragraphs7.3, 7.4; M/15/020 – Topaz/Esso Ireland, paragraphs 
94, 95, 107, 152, 153; and, M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 4.2, 4.49.  
88 EC, (2008, paragraph 17). 
89 Andrews, Gorecki & McFadden (2015, pp. 353-354); and, OECD (2012, p. 109).  
90 See, for example, M/07/040 – Communicorp/SRH, where Communicorp divested itself of FM104, a radio station. 
91 See, for example, M/06/098 – Premier Foods/RHM, where Premier Foods divested the complete range of products 
sold under the Erin brand, even though competition concerns only applied to a subset of products sold under the 
Erin brand. 
15 | P a g e  
 
Laundry as a competitive force and thus preserving pre merger competition.  The divested business might 
have been, for example, Kings Laundry’s healthcare business.  The merged entity would thus have 
consolidated only the hospitality market operations of Berendsen and Kings Laundry.  
There would, however, appear to be difficulties associated with such a divestment package.   As the CCPC 
notes, the  
“2.3 … linen maintenance process is similar in both healthcare and hospitality sectors with 
the same techniques and equipment used to wash, dry and iron soiled linen returned to 
customers in both sectors.  Thus, linen laundries catering for customers in both sectors tend 
to process linen in the same facility.” 
In the State although there are standalone hospitality facilities, there are no standalone healthcare 
facilities.92  The latter are always combined with a facility that maintains hospitality linen, suggesting that 
there are economies of scope. It also appears that linen laundries operate a fleet of collection vehicles 
that collect linen from both sectors.93  
A divestment remedy confined to healthcare does not seem feasible.94  However, a divestment package 
that covered more than Kings Laundry’s healthcare operations would appear to involve the divestment of 
Kings Laundry itself, rather than a subset of its activities.  Such a divestment package would raise questions 
over the practicality of the merger in the first place. 
The divestment package in Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry is not the sale of business unit but rather the 
disposal of three Berendsen healthcare contracts to a third party purchaser approved by the CCPC.  These 
three contracts have to reach a certain – albeit redacted – aggregate value.  Should they fail to do so, then 
additional contracts will need to be divested until the value is reached.  
While the divestment package in Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry is not the sale of a business unit as per 
the European Commission’s preferred option, it is nevertheless worth noting that the European 
Commission states that “Other structural commitments may be suitable to resolve all types of concerns if 
those remedies are equivalent in their effects …”.95    The issue thus becomes whether or not the disposal 
of the three Berendsen healthcare contracts is equivalent, in its effects, to the divestment of Kings 
Laundry’s healthcare operations.   
 
92 “Currently, there are five linen laundries providing outsourced flat linen rental and maintenance services to both 
healthcare and hospitality sectors in the State. There is no linen laundry focusing on the provision of outsourced flat 
linen rental and maintenance services to the healthcare sector only. In comparison, in addition to linen laundries 
operating in both sectors, there are six linen laundries currently focusing on the hospitality sector only in the State .” 
M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 3.39. 
93 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 2.5. 
94 There might also be problems in that the Kings Laundry brand would be jointly owned by the divested business 
and the merged entity.  This could lead to difficulties in that if the divested business (or the merged entity) undertook 
conduct that damaged (enhanced) the Kings Laundry brand that would impact not only on the divested business but 
also the merged entity. It was because of such externalities, which might be both positive and negative, that in 
M/06/098 – Premier Foods/RHM the entire range of products sold under the Erin brand were divested rather than 
the subset where competitive problems were identified.  
95 EC (2008, paragraph 17). 
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In making such a judgment there is an inevitable degree of uncertainty reflecting the redactions in the 
CCPC merger determination concerning the remedy. The aggregate value of the three contracts and the 
period for which the merged entity will not compete for those contracts are both redacted.  Neither the 
purchaser/three divestment contract period(s) nor the parameters of the alternative package are 
specified. Furthermore, the CCPC does not report on compliance with merger determination 
commitments, unlike the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority,96 so there is (or will be) no record of 
which package was finally implemented.  However, notwithstanding these limitations, there are a number 
of valid comments that can be made about the three contract divestment remedy. 
First, the counterparties to the three contracts are likely to be large well informed healthcare customers, 
well able to evaluate the state of competition on the healthcare market and pre merger play one 
healthcare supplier off against another.  This inference is based on the fact that the three contracts are 
likely to be of substantial importance if they are to be the basis of the purchaser replicating Kings Laundry 
as one of the three significant competitors in the healthcare market. 
Second, the purchaser of the three contracts is given a period post merger when the merged entity has 
agreed that “it shall not actively solicit healthcare linen business from a customer” whose contract was 
divested for a period that is redacted in the CCPC’s merger determination.97 This is essentially a non-
compete clause by the merged entity. The merged entity has undertaken not to actively compete for the 
divested contracts.  Hence for these three customers when procuring healthcare contracts there will be 
only two bidders: Celtic Laundry and the supplier that purchased the three Berendsen contracts.  All other 
healthcare customers will have the benefit of a third bidder: the merged entity.  
Third, typically in divestment remedies the merged entity does not need the permission or sanction of a 
third party when it disposes of the divestment package, except, of course, the competition agency that is 
usually required to approve the purchaser. In the Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry merger remedy that is 
unlikely to be the case.  The three contracts that are to be disposed of by the merged entity to a third 
party almost certainly require the permission of the healthcare customer with whom Berendsen has the 
existing contract.98 Assuming, as seems reasonable, the customer is satisfied with Berendsen’s existing 
service, why would it want to move to another healthcare supplier, especially since this would involve a 
reduction in their choice of healthcare suppliers from three (pre merger) to two (post merger)?   
Fourth, the prospective purchaser of the healthcare contracts may not have a very secure title to these 
contracts once they expire.  As noted above, the merged entity undertakes not to “actively” compete for 
these contracts once they have been divested. Active sales although not defined in the Berendsen 
(Elis)/Kings Laundry merger determination, are defined by the European Commission as “actively 
approaching individual customers by for instance direct mail, including the sending of unsolicited e-mails, 
or visits.”99  
 
96 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mergers-orders-and-undertakings.  
97 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, Section 9, Clause 8. 
98 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, Section 9, Clause 5, reads: “In assessing the suitability of a Third Party 
Purchaser, the Commission shall accept the decision of a Relevant Customer that its Healthcare Contract can be 
divested by Berendsen to the relevant Third Party Purchaser ….” Note the use of the word “can.” The CCPC were not 
prepared to clarify the issue since the divestment process was ongoing.  Email exchange 11 May 2020. 
99 EC (2010, paragraph 51).  
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Passive sales by the merged entity, however, are not prohibited under the commitments.  Passive sales 
are defined by the European Commission as “responding to unsolicited requests from individual customers 
including delivery of goods or services to such customers.”100 In other words, there is nothing to prevent 
the three customers whose contracts have been divested from Berendsen approaching the merged entity 
for healthcare supplies, once a contract has expired.  
Fifth, the European Commission Remedies Notice states, as noted above, that the “commitments will 
normally have to foresee that no reacquisition of material influence is possible for a significant period, 
generally of 10 years.”  The CCPC has redacted the non-compete period, but it seems unlikely to be for as 
long as 10 years.  Among healthcare providers 86 per cent of their customer contracts were three years 
or less, while if attention is confined to large providers, across both the hospitality and health markets, 
then 90 per cent if customer contracts are three years or less.101 Since the customers whose contracts are 
to be divested are likely to be larger the latter percentage is relevant.   
The upshot of this discussion is that the three contract divestment option is a very poor substitute for the 
divestment of Kings Laundry’s healthcare business.  The counterparties to these contracts have little 
incentive to switch from Berendsen.  Indeed, these three customers have a positive disincentive to switch 
since post merger their choice of healthcare suppliers will be reduced from three to two.  The non-
compete clause of the remedy before which the merged entity can actively attempt to reacquire the three 
divested contracts is unlikely to be the 10 years specified by the European Commission before 
reacquisition is permitted.  In any even if the non-compete clause was 10 years this only refers to active 
sales.  Hence the merged entity is not prohibited from passive sales once the initial contract – typically 
three years or less - between the purchaser and the customer has expired.   
Suitable Purchaser   
Three conditions are identified for a suitable purchaser in the European Commission’s Remedies Notice:  
“48. ….independent  and unconnected to the parties, … must possess the financial resources, 
proven relevant expertise and have the incentive and ability to maintain and develop the 
divested business as a viable and active competitive force in competition with the parties 
and other competitors; and … [not] give rise to a risk that the implementation of the 
commitments will be delayed.”  
Attention will be confined to the second condition. 
Based on the CCPC’s detailed and careful analysis of existing competitors to Berendsen, Kings Laundry and 
Celtic Linen as well as whether or not entry and/or expansion is likely timely or sufficient, there does not 
appear to be any suitable purchaser – actual or potential - with, for example, “proven relevant expertise.“ 
In discussing the merger remedies the CCPC never addresses the stark fact that based on its own analysis 
there are grave doubts as to the existence of a suitable purchaser. 
A critical factor mentioned in the CCPC’s analysis of entry and expansion is the lack of experience in 
providing healthcare services by the firms surveyed as possible entrants.102  The three contract divestment 
 
100 EC (2010, paragraph 51). 
101 Amarach Research (2019, Slide 26).  
102 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 4.347-4.351. 
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package does nothing directly to rectify that deficit. While, as noted above, Berendsen offers to furnish 
some ancillary items such as linen stock as part of the three contract divestment package, no facilities or 
physical assets (e.g. washers, dryers or trucks) are included, nor is there is any mention of the transfer of 
key personnel with experience in providing healthcare services.103  It is the case that the proposals commit 
Berendsen to “otherwise assist the Third Party Purchaser [of the three contracts] to enable it to provide 
the services in respect of the” three contracts.104 Whether that includes personnel is not specified.105 
Implementation Risks   
Once the remedy has been agreed and approved by the CCPC and memorialised as binding commitments 
the remedy has to be implemented. The risks associated with implementation can be divided into two 
categories: the remedy is not implemented “within short period of time;”106 and, the remedy is 
implemented, but there are ongoing monitoring problems.    
But what precisely does timely implementation mean?  For the European Commission its Remedies Notice 
provides the  answer:  
“97. The divestiture has to be completed within a fixed time period agreed between the 
parties and the Commission. In the Commission’s practice, the total time period is divided 
into a period for entering into a final agreement and a further period for the closing, the 
transfer of legal title, of the transaction. The period for entering into a binding agreement is 
further normally divided into a first period in which the parties can look for a suitable 
purchaser (the “first divestiture period”) and, if the parties do not succeed to divest the 
business, a second period in which a divestiture trustee obtains the mandate to divest the 
business at no minimum price (the “trustee divestiture period”).   
  
98. The Commission’s experience has shown that short divestiture periods contribute largely 
to the success of the divestiture as, otherwise, the business to be divested will be exposed to 
an extended period of uncertainty. The time periods should therefore be as short as feasible. 
The Commission will normally consider a period of around six months for the first divestiture 
period and an additional period of three months for the trustee divestiture period as 
appropriate. A period of further three months is normally foreseen for closing the 
transaction. These periods may be modified on a case-by-case basis. In particular, they may 
have to be shortened if there is a high risk of degradation of the business’ viability in the 
interim period.” 
In other words, at the end of nine months, one way or another, the implementation of the remedy 
package should have been agreed. 
 
103 The European Commission in its Remedies Notice stresses the importance of key personnel in this context (EC, 
2008, paragraphs 25 to 27).  
104 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 6(ii).  
105 The CCPC were not prepared to clarify the issue since the divestment process was ongoing.  Email exchange with 
CCPC, 11 May 2020. The obvious key employee is the Berendsen Manager.  (M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings 
Laundry, Section 9, Clause 27). 
106 EC (2008, paragraph 9). 
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The Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry transaction cannot be completed “unless and until” the remedy is 
implemented.  Since Kings Laundry anticipates that it will be controlled by Berendsen once the remedy 
has been implemented, in the meantime it may compete less vigorously against its future owner.  
Investment decisions might be put on hold. Unless guarantees have been given to key Kings Laundry staff 
some may switch to other employment opportunities.  In European Commission parlance the asset 
becomes “degraded.”107 
As noted above, the CCPC was clearly concerned about implementation risks.108 Indeed, the CCPC rejected 
the parties second set of proposals due to such risks.  To mitigate the implementation risks the CCPC 
accepted what the European Commission classifies, in its Remedies Notice, as  an “Up-front Buyer:” 
“53. There are cases where only the proposal of an up-front buyer will allow the Commission 
to conclude with the requisite degree of certainty that the business will be effectively 
divested to a suitable purchaser. The parties therefore have to undertake in the 
commitments that they are not going to complete the notified operation before having 
entered into a binding agreement with a purchaser for the divested business, approved by 
the Commission.   
 
54. First, this concerns cases where there are considerable obstacles for a divestiture, such 
as third party rights, or uncertainties as to finding a suitable purchaser. In such cases, an up-
front buyer will allow the Commission to conclude with the requisite degree of certainty that 
the commitments will be implemented, as such a commitment creates greater incentives for 
the parties to close the divestiture in order to be able to complete their own concentration. 
In these circumstances, parties may choose between proposing an up-front buyer and an 
alternative divestiture commitment, … .” 
There can be little doubt that, based on the discussion above concerning the adequacy of the divestment 
package and the difficulties of finding a suitable purchaser, that the CCPC was right to be concerned about 
implementation risks.  The CCPC followed best practice by accepting the proposal of an up-front buyer as 
a way to mitigate implementation risks.    
The timelines for completion of the process of finding an upfront buyer satisfactory to the CCPC are 
redacted from the Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry merger determination.  The merger determination is 
dated 8 July 2019.  Notwithstanding these redactions, on 8 April 2020, nine months later, the divestment 
process is still ongoing according to the CCPC.109  Under the European Commission Remedies Notice nine 
months is at the outer time limit for the timely acceptance of a remedy package.  
The European Commission in its Remedies Notice also argued that after the initial six months that the 
divestment package should be sold at no minimum price.  The Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry remedy 
package contains no such clause.  Instead, as noted above, if Berendsen is unable to find a buyer for the 
three healthcare contracts then “it would enter into discussions with the Commission to identify an 
alternative package of healthcare contracts that could be divested to an approved third party purchaser(s) 
 
107 EC (2008, paragraph 11).  It is not possible to assess whether this has occurred, but it is an important general 
concern expressed by the European Commission in its guidance. 
108 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 1.30-1.38; 5.15-5.18. 
109 The CCPC provided this information to the author in an email dated 8 April 2020. 
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and that would address the Commission’s competition concerns.”110 This is likely to prolong the period 
between the date of the merger determination and completion of the transaction.111 
Turning next to monitoring there is an issue concerning the distinction between active and passive sales.  
Assume that a purchaser is found for these three contracts.  Since the possession of these three contracts 
is supposed to turn the buyer into a credible competitor to the merged entity and replicate Kings Laundry 
in the healthcare market, it seems reasonable to assume that the contracts will be of substantial value.  
The merged entity is likely to want to reacquire these customer contracts, but is prohibited from active 
sales. 
Suppose the merged entity met a representative of one (or more) of the three divested customer 
contracts.  This could be at an industry trade association meeting or a social gathering.  The conversation 
turns to industry developments.  The customer asks the merged entity how business is going, perhaps 
inviting them to tender for future healthcare contracts. The merged entity is likely to respond by extolling 
its business success and agreeing to submit a tender. Is this passive or active sales? Will the CCPC be in a 
position to monitor such behaviour? 
Approval of Purchaser  
The CCPC, like the European Commission, ensures that the conditions specified in the commitments are 
complied with before allowing the transaction to be completed. In Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry that 
means that the CCPC is required to approve the purchaser of the three contracts.  The CCPC, in assessing 
the suitability of the purchaser, 
“may have regard to factors such as its financial resources, expertise in the rental and 
maintenance of flat linen, contingency planning and whether such Third Party Purchaser is 
committed to maintaining and developing the Healthcare Contracts (and the healthcare 
contracts, as the case may be) and being an active competitive force in the healthcare 
market.”112 
The language is redolent of the European Commission’s Remedy Notice (paragraph 48). While the list 
of factors is clearly relevant in view of the CCPC’s competitive assessment and the response of 
customers to the market testing of the second set of proposals, the use of “may” rather than “shall” is 
problematic. 
No information is provided on a systematic basis by the CCPC concerning whether or not the commitments 
entered into in a merger determination are satisfied and/or whether or not they are still extant.  In the 
Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry this might mean that the CCPC would publish a reasoned decision as to 
why the purchaser of the three contracts satisfied the conditions specified above for a suitable purchaser.  
Such a decision is particularly important when – as is the case in the Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry – the 
merger remedies are complex and legitimate questions can be raised concerning whether or not they cure 
the competitive harm identified by the CCPC in the healthcare market.   
 
110 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 5.17. 
111 The alternative package is not specified in the merger determination nor, not surprisingly, was this package 
market tested. 
112 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, Section 9, Clause 4. 
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The European Commission, in its Remedies Notice, sets out the procedural steps and requirements in 
order for the approval of the purchaser.113  The European Commission publishes, on occasion, a “Decision 
on the Implementation of Remedies – Purchaser Approval.” This decision uses the framework set out 
above under “Suitable Purchaser” in approving a purchaser.  In clearing General Electric’s purchaser of 
Alstom (Thermal-Renewable Power Grid Business), for example, certain assets had to be divested and 
Ansaldo Energia S. pA. (Ansaldo) was considered a suitable purchaser.114  However, it was only after a 
Reasoned Opinion from a Monitoring Trustee that the European Commission approved Ansaldo as the 
purchaser.  The European Commission’s reasoned decision approving Ansaldo published. It ran to 85 
paragraphs.115 
The publication of a CCPC reasoned decision on the viability of the purchaser lessens the possibility of a 
Type II error (i.e., a finding that there was no SLC whereas in fact there was an SLC). It ensures an extra 
layer of transparency and accountability. Unlike merger reviews by European Commission, those by the 
CCPC are not subject to third party appeal.  The publication by the CCPC of reasoned decisions on the 
suitability of the purchaser should not impose a significant additional administrative burden on the 
agency.  The CCPC would no doubt draw heavily on the Monitoring Trustee’s report setting out how the 
CCPC’s “requirements as to suitability” had been satisfied.116 
Remedy Package: Overview 
Having considered all the relevant aspects of the remedy the question of whether or not the divestment 
of three healthcare contracts is likely to cure the competitive harm occasioned by the transaction can be 
addressed.  The discussion is summarised in Table 2. 
Pre merger all healthcare customers benefit from competition between Berendsen, Kings Laundry and 
Celtic Linen.  The Ideal Remedy is that Kings Laundry’s healthcare business is sold to a suitable purchaser.  
Such a remedy would likely cure the competitive harm.  Post merger there would be still be three 
significant choices for healthcare customers.  
The Ideal Remedy is not, however, a feasible option for reasons set out above and need not be rehearsed 
here.  Instead, the Proposed Remedy is the sale of three Berendsen healthcare contracts to a suitable 
purchaser.  In evaluating the Proposed Remedy customers are divided into two groups: the three 
customers that are the counterparties to the three divested contracts; and, all other healthcare 
customers.  Each group is considered separately. 
The number of healthcare suppliers that the three customers have to chose from has been reduced from 
three to two, since recall the merged entity has undertaken not to actively compete for their business. 
Typically, healthcare customers like to source from two suppliers for security of supply reasons.117 The 
reduction in the number of healthcare providers from three to two thus reduces the bargaining power of 
the three customers.  This is likely to lead to an SLC for these three customers, particularly in view of the 
 
113 EC (2008, paragraphs 101-106). 
114 This is a so-called “Fix-it-first” remedy by the European Commission (EC, 2008, paragraphs 56-57). 
115 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7278_6893_3.pdf.  
116 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, Section 9, Clause 23. 
117 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 4.40 (a), 4.369. 
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CCPC’s view that “Celtic Linen would have an ability and incentive to raise its prices in response to a price 
rise by the merged entity.”118 
The extent of the post merger price rise for these three customers will depend on: the length of the non-
compete clause entered into by the merged entity as part of the remedy; the initial contract length 
between these three customers and the purchaser of the contracts from Berendsen; and, the importance 
of passive sales by the merged entity in reacquiring the divested contracts before the non-compete clause 
expires. The longer the non-compete clause, other things being equal, the greater the impact on these 
three customers.  However, the shorter the contract the less attractive acquiring the three contracts is 
likely to be to any would be purchaser.    
Table 2 
Outsourced Supply of Flat Linen Rental & Maintenance Services to Healthcare Customers, Pre & Post 
Merger, A Comparison of the Ideal & Proposed Remedies, Ireland. 
 Healthcare Providers 
Pre Merger Berendsen, Celtic Linen, Kings Laundry 
Post Merger Healthcare Providers/SLC 
Ideal Remedy: Kings Laundry 
(Healthcare)a business divested 
Merged Entity,a Celtic Linen, Kings Laundry (Healthcare)/No SLC 
 All Customers 
(Less the Three Divested 
Customer Contracts) 
The Three Divested Customer 
Contracts 
Proposed Remedy: Three 
Berendsen healthcare contracts 
divested/not a viable 
competitor 
Merged Entity,b Celtic Linen, 
Purchaser of  the Three 
Contracts/SLC 
Celtic Linen, Purchaser of the 
Three Contracts/SLC 
a. Kings Laundry (Healthcare) is the healthcare business of Kings Laundry, all Kings Laundry’s other 
activities are merged with Berendsen to form a merged entity. 
b. Merged entity is Berendsen plus the entire Kings Laundry business, less the three Berendsen 
healthcare contracts which are to be divested under the commitments in M/18/063 – Berendsen 
(Elis)/Kings Laundry. 
Source: See text.  
 
Post merger all the other healthcare customers will be able to avail of the services of three healthcare 
providers: the merged entity; Celtic Linen; and, the firm that purchases the three contracts. If the latter 
firm is a credible competitor and is able to replace Kings Laundry as a significant force in the healthcare 
market, then it is likely that these customers will not experience a price rise post merger; if, however, the 
purchaser of the three contracts is not a credible competitor/replacement for Kings Laundry then a prices 
will rise.  The analysis above suggests that, based on the available evidence, a competitor replicating Kings 
Laundry is unlikely to emerge, leading to an SLC for this subset of customers. 
 
 
 
118 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 4.307. 
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VII. Conclusion 
A Merger Determination at War with Itself? 
The CCPC has made a compelling case that the three to two Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry merger in the 
healthcare market will result in an SLC. However, the divestment package of three contracts, based on 
the available information, will not be sufficient to ameliorate the competitive concerns raised in the 
CCPC’s analysis.  Indeed, the remedy package is likely to lead an SLC rather than its mitigation: 
 
• for customers that are the counterparties to the three Berendsen contracts, the remedy 
will result in a decline in the number of healthcare providers from three pre merger to 
two post merger.  Neither provider is likely to be an especially vigorous competitor; 
• for all other healthcare customers, although the number of healthcare providers remains 
unchanged at three pre and post merger, the evidence suggests that the purchaser of the 
three contracts is unlikely to replace Kings Laundry as a significant competitive force in 
the healthcare market; and, 
• the failure to implement the remedy within the nine month window deemed appropriate 
by the European Commission raises concerns that Kings Laundry as a competitive force in 
the hospitality and healthcare markets will become, in European Commission parlance, 
“degraded.” 
 
In sum, the commitments do not meet the sensible criteria set out by the European Commission: that 
they should result in the “elimination of the competition concerns entirely and have to be comprehensive 
and effective from all points of view. Furthermore, commitments must be capable of being implemented 
effectively within a short period of time as the conditions of competition on the market will not be 
maintained until the commitments have been fulfilled.” 
Is the Remedy Proportionate? 
The CCPC prefaces its discussion of remedies by raising the issue of proportionately.  It states, 
“Kings Laundry accounts for just under […]% of the healthcare market and so is a significant 
supplier. However, the Commission notes that Kings Laundry’s healthcare business accounts 
for less than […]% of its revenue, while the remaining […]% of its revenue is generated from 
its hospitality business. The Commission, therefore, considers that, if the SLC concerns in the 
healthcare market are capable of being addressed either through proposals or specified 
conditions, it may not be proportionate to require that the merger may not be put into 
effect.”119 
Of course, the CCPC is correct if the competition concerns expressed in its determination can be 
successfully resolved through proposals or specified conditions then prohibition would be 
disproportionate.  However, the specified conditions as embodied in the divestment of three contracts in 
 
119 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraph 5.2. 
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the healthcare market do not address the SLC concerns for reasons set out above.  Nonetheless, the issue 
of proportionality is worth considering. 
It could be argued that it would be disproportionate for the merger remedy to cover more than the 
horizontal overlap in the healthcare market. In other words, any proposals should not include the 
hospitality operations of Kings Laundry or Berendsen. This is not a sustainable argument.  
The European Commission’s Remedies Notice specifically addresses this issue: 
23. The divested activities must consist of a viable business that, if operated by a suitable 
purchaser, can compete effectively with the merged entity on a lasting basis and that is 
divested as a going concern. For the business to be viable, it may also be necessary to include 
activities which are related to markets where the Commission did not identify competition 
concerns if this is required to create an effective competitor in the affected markets.120 
The CCPC has consistently followed the Remedies Notice approach.  In M/06/098 – Premier Foods/RHM 
the CCPC accepted a remedy that extended beyond the area of concern precisely for the reasons set out 
by the European Commission.121  In M/08/009 – Kerry/Breeo the CCPC prohibited the merger on the 
grounds that there was an SLC in three of the nine markets where there was an overlap between the 
parties.122 
Proportionality might also refer to the fact that there may be offsetting efficiencies to a merger which 
should be set against the anticompetitive harm.  The CCPC’s Merger Guidelines specifically discuss the 
conditions under which such efficiencies can lead to an otherwise anticompetitive merger being cleared. 
However, in the Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry merger no arguments were put forward by the parties 
concerning efficiencies that might flow from the merger.123 
Whether or not a merger will lead to an SLC requires a careful evaluation and weighing of the evidence. 
In some instances, the preponderance of evidence is much stronger for finding an SLC than in other 
instances.  When the evidence is less strong, it could be argued, that it is disproportionate to prohibit the 
merger.  While not commenting on the validity of the argument, in this author’s view the evidential base 
in the Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry merger determination points very strongly to an SLC in the 
healthcare market.124 
 
120 The International Competition Network (2016, Section 2.2, p.3) adopts the same approach in its Merger Remedies 
Guide.  
121 See footnotes 91 and 94 above. 
122 In the successful High Court appeal against the CCPC’s prohibition of the Kerry/Breeo merger, the issue of 
proportionality and prohibition was not argued by the parties.  Rye Investments Ltd v Competition Authority [2009] 
IEHC 140. 
123 M/18/063 – Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry, paragraphs 4.388-4.389.  The onus is on the parties to furnish such 
a case to the CCPC. 
124 Using market share and the HHI index suggests the greater restriction in competition in Berendsen (Elis)/Kings 
Laundry than, for example, in Kerry/Breeo.  In the former the merged entity would account for [60-70] per cent of 
the healthcare market, with a post-merger HHI of 5348 and a delta of 1249 (Table 1).  The corresponding values in 
the Kerry/Breeo merger for non-poultry cooked meats were: [45-50] per cent; 2682; and, 979 (M/08/009 – 
Kerry/Breeo, paragraph 6.86 & Table 6.6, p. 88); and, for rashers: [40-50] per cent; 2550; and, 1093 (M/08/009 – 
Kerry/Breeo, Tables 5.1, p. 55 & Table 5.4, p. 57 ). 
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Is This Time Different? 
As noted in the Introduction the last time that the CCPC issued an Assessment prior to Berendsen 
(Elis)/Kings Laundry was in the Kerry/Breeo merger more than a decade ago. However, in the latter case 
the CCPC prohibited the merger.  The burden of this paper is that the CCPC should have also prohibited 
the Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry merger.  This raises the issue of whether or not there are any lessons 
or considerations in the Kerry/Breeo experience that might be relevant in influencing current merger 
decisional practice of the CCPC. 
In Kerry/Breeo although the CCPC prohibited the merger on 28 August 2008, on appeal the High Court 
overturned the CCPC’s prohibition in judgment dated 19 March 2009. The grounds related, inter alia, to 
the weight that should be given to evidence generated after the merger announcement as compared to 
before.  In April 2016 the CCPC abandoned its appeal to the Supreme Court in part because of the delay 
(the Supreme Court refused the CCPC’s application for a priority hearing) and in part because the CCPC 
“agreed satisfactory settlement terms … relating to the costs of the High Court and Supreme Court 
proceedings.”125  
The present case is distinguishable from the Kerry/Breeo case in several important respects that mean it 
may not be a reliable precedent were the CCPC to have prohibited the Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry 
merger.  First, the CCPC’s Merger Guidelines were updated in 2013.   The guidance that was extant at the 
time of Kerry/Breeo made no mention of the relative merits of evidence dated before and after the 
transaction had been announced.126  However, the updated guidance states that the “Commission will 
give much greater weight to evidence that pre-dates the announcement of the merger under review in 
comparison to post-merger announcement evidence.”127 In the Kerry/Breeo High Court judgment the 
Court acknowledged the importance of the CCPC’s guidance as a framework for merger analysis.128  Hence 
the fact that the Merger Guidelines have been updated should give the CCPC much firmer grounds for 
favouring pre as opposed to post merger announcement evidence as it did in its discussion of the 
counterfactual in Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry. 
Second, in the Kerry/Breeo case some critical evidence was presented late in the merger review period 
by the parties and the CCPC did not have time to properly investigate and assess the value of the evidence. 
Some of this evidence was generated after the announcement of the merger.  The High Court saw no 
reason not to accept such evidence at face value.129  In Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry the CCPC appears 
to have been able to evaluate all the evidence put forward by the parties and the arguments made in the 
Assessment.  The difference reflects, amongst other things, the 2014 amendments to the Competition Act 
2002 that extended the maximum time that the CCPC had to assess mergers, in part by converting 
calendar days into working days but without changing the nominal number of days.  Hence having 
insufficient time to review the evidence is much less likely to arise in Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry. 
Third, although the High Court dealt reasonably expeditiously with the Kerry/Breeo appeal from the 
CCPC’s determination, there were considerable delays in obtaining a hearing before the Supreme Court.  
 
125 For details see: Competition Authority (2013, p. 31); and, CCPC (2016). The quotation is from the latter source. 
126 Competition Authority (2002).  
127 CCPC (2014, paragraph 7.11). 
128 Rye Investments Ltd v Competition Authority [2009] IEHC 140, paragraphs 3.10 – 3.12. 
129 For discussion see Gorecki (2009). 
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These delays accounted for, in part at least, the CCPC abandoning its appeal from the High Court judgment 
to the Supreme Court.   However, since the Kerry/Breeo merger the  Court of Appeal has been created so 
that appeals from the High Court no longer go directly to the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal was 
established on 28 October 2014.  The Court was designed in part to reduce the workload on the Supreme 
Court and thus speed the dispensation of justice.  Hence it seems reasonable to assume that any appeal 
from a High Court decision will be heard more quickly than in Kerry/Breeo.  In the Director of Public 
Prosecutions’ appeal from the Central Criminal Court’s sentencing in the commercial flooring bid-rigging 
cartel case to the Court of Appeal judgement was thirteen months.130  
In sum, the CCPC should have prohibited the Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry merger. The Kerry/Breeo 
precedent suggests that several of the difficulties experienced the last time that the CCPC prohibited a 
merger are no longer present.  
 
130 The Central Criminal Court is the criminal division of the High Court. The sentencing in the commercial flooring 
bid-rigging cartel was delivered on 31 May 2017, the Court of Appeal judgment 20 June 2018. While the Court of 
Appeal dealt with the commercial flooring bid-rigging cartel reasonably expeditiously, the Court’s competitive 
assessment and sentencing methodology are not reassuring.  For details see: Gorecki (2019). On the broader issue 
of the Courts and competition policy in Ireland see Gorecki (forthcoming). 
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